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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The Status of the Police Power of Ohio
Municipalities to Enact Criminal Ordinances
Prior to 1912, Ohio municipalities were divided into two classes ac-
cording to their size. This arbitrary division was the sole means em-
ployed to determine governmental structure.' Such a system, whereby
"the municipal code provides ...one single form of government for
all villages,"2 failed to meet the ever increasing needs of cities which
were beginning to develop their modern appearance in an industrial
society. Moreover, since municipal corporations possessed such powers
as were
expressly granted by statute, and such as may be implied as essential
to carrying into effect those which are expressly granted, the result ...
was that the Legislature assumed the full and complete authority over
the governmental powers of municipalities.3
With the predominantly agrarian sector in almost complete control of
the legislature, the straight jacket began to tighten on the cities, and
relief was iminent.
Relief manifested itself in the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio
Constitution4 which, among other things, opened the door for each city
to adopt the form of government it desired, and removed centralized
legislative control over municipal functions.'
Some proponents of the Home Rule Amendment envisioned munici-
palities as having all powers of local self-government, an rimperium in
imperio."6 The early decisions, however, left little doubt that at least
"police, sanitary, and other similar regulations" would be subject to the
prohibition that they not "conflict with general laws" of the state.' How
1. The Ohio Municipal Code of 1902 divided municipalities into two groups "including all
places with a population in excess of 5,000 and villages, which could have 5000 [sic] or
less. One uniform plan of government was provided for each of these two groups." Walker,
Municipal Government in Ohio Before 1912, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 12 (1948).
2. Id. at 13 n. 21.
3. 1 CROWLEY, OHIO MUNICIPAL LAW § 5.04, at 41 (1962).
4. The grant of home rule to municipalities is primarily in article XVIII, section 3 of the
Ohio Constitution: "Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-
government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other
similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws."
5. 1 CROWLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 5.09.
6. Fordham & Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 18, 21
(1948).
7. In analyzing article XVIII, section 3 of the Ohio Constitution, the early decisions concluded
that there are two separate and distinct grants of power. Whether the "non-conflict" clause,
therefore, limits both grants of power or only the second one relating to police, sanitary, and
other similar regulations has been resolved in State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574,
53 N.E.2d 501 (1944), to pertain only to the second grant of power. But see Benjamin v.
City of Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957). It is undisputable, neverthe-
less, that the grant of police power is subject to the limitation that it will not be in conflict
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much authority was actually given, and how much power municipalities
now have to define crimes and impose penal sanctions in accordance with
the exercising of police power are questions which are still being resolved
by the legislature and courts today.
The legislature had exclusive control over municipalties before the
Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution. And even after the
amendment, some courts were still of the opinion that "there is no such
thing as municipal police power as distinguished from state police power
... . [P]olice power is a power that inheres only in the sovereign.' '8
Since municipalities are not sovereigns, they are not inherently able to
exercise that power. Subsequently, however, a view was expounded by
some courts that municipalities themselves, and not the state, have in-
herent police power.' But the view accepted by the majority of courts
has been that article XVIII, section 3 of the Ohio Constitution "con-
templates that both the state and the municipalities of the state may
exercise the same police power; the only limitation being that the exer-
cise of that power by a municipality shall not conflict with the general
laws of the state."'"
If municipalities have their own police power up to the point that the
exercise of such power "conflicts" with the "general laws" of the state,
the obvious problem is to define "general laws" and "conflicts."
WHAT ARE "GENERAL LAWS"?
Before the 1912 Home Rule Amendment was passed, the munici-
pality was completely dominated by the state. A statute such as section
6307-6 of the General Code was typical. It provided that local au-
thorities could not regulate the speed of motor vehicles by ordinance.
The question of whether this statute was an example of the "general
laws" referred to in the Ohio Constitution was decided in the negative
in City of Fremont v. Keating." Here, the court held that "general
laws" were not statutes which expressly granted or denied power to
municipalities. They are, however, statutes which contain provisions of
with the general laws of the state. For a general discussion of the history and the varied
interpretations which have been given to section 3 of the Home Rule Amendment, see 3
FARRELL-ELLIS, OHIO MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 1.20-1.30 (11th ed. 1962), and Fordham &
Asher, supra note 6, at 18-27.
8. Cleveland Tel. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 362, 121 N.E. 701, 702 (1918).
9. State ex rel. Ellis v. Blakemore, 116 Ohio St. 650, 660, 157 N.E. 330, 333 (1927).
10. Greenburg v. City of Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 282, 286, 120 N.E. 829, 830 (1918).
11. 96 Ohio St. 468, 470, 118 N.E. 114 (1917); accord, Greenburg v. City of Cleveland,
supra note 10, at 286, 120 N.E. at 830. "The purpose of the non-conflict provision... is
not to empower the General Assembly to directly limit or restrict the power of municipalities
to adopt police regulations, but, instead, is to secure uniform operation of state police regu-
lations throughout all the political subdivisions of the state." 3 FARRELL-ELLIS, op. cit. supra
note 7, § 1.30(a), at 40.
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substantive law to be followed generally throughout the state.12 Section
6307-6, therefore, was unconstitutional.
The rule in the Keating case has been generally accepted by Ohio
courts. In City of Youngstown v. Evans,3 the statute in question limited
the term of imprisonment a municipal ordinance could impose to six
months. The court found this statute unconstitutional as it was not a
"general law" contemplated under the Home Rule Amendment.
WHAT IS "CONFLICT"?
Whether substantive powers to define crimes and impose criminal
sanctions are to be exercised by the state exclusively, by the state and
the municipality concurrently, or by the municipality itself are issues
which should have been answered simply. That is, since the municipal
corporation can exercise its police power up to the point of "conflict"
with substantive provisions of state law, it would seem relatively simple to
develop a workable definition of "conflict." But the courts of Ohio
have not taken the simplest approach. For one thing, the decisions
which develop the concept of "conflict" are sensitive to overriding policy
determinations, necessitating some relaxation of strict logical principles.
Moreover, the decisions which attempt to rely solely on precedent are
conflicting in many instances. This writer will attempt to give the
reader an insight into the various possibilities of construing "conflict."
A discussion of underlying policy considerations, which have so much
effect in most decisions, will follow.
Implied Conflict
One alternative in defining conflict is to provide that where the state
has a statute covering the same subject matter as the municipal ordinance,
the ordinance is void if it attempts to modify the statute. This is so even
if the statute could have prohibited an act and did not. The municipality
has no right to modify a state statute. Although an implied right to do
an act not expressly prohibited by the state has accrued, no power exists
in the municipality to infringe on the state's pre-emption of the subject
matter. The rationale of such a policy is based upon the principle that
only the state has the power to define crimes. Therefore, since there
are no common-law crimes in Ohio,"4 conduct the state does not define
as a crime must be a legal act. One of the strong arguments for such
a policy is the need for uniformity in criminal law.
12. "General law" includes regulations of administrative agencies as they are the "voice of
the general assembly ... " Neil House Hotel Co. v. City of Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 252,
58 N.E.2d 665, 667 (1944).
13. 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929).
14. State v. Healy, 156 Ohio St. 229, 239, 102 N.E.2d 233, 239 (1951); Vanvalkenburg
v. State, 11 Ohio 404, 405 (1842).
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Although this view has been adopted by several jurisdictions, Ohio,
with a few exceptions, has avoided this rule. The most notable excep-
tion is Neil House Hotel Co. v. City of Columbus.'5 In that case a state
statute prohibited the sale of beer and intoxicating liquors after 2:30
a.m. on Sunday. The court invalidated a Columbus ordinance which
banned the sale of intoxicating beverages after midnight as conflicting
with the general law of the state. In so doing, the court emphasized
that since under the state law, selling liquor after midnight but before
2:30 a.m. was not prohibited, an ordinance which banned this must
be invalid. There is a right to do what the state does not prohibit. 6 The
dissent,"7 however, recognized the need for local, rather than centralized
control, holding that just because there is no wrong created by statute,
there is no absolute right created either. Moreover, under the implied
right theory, it is foreseeable that the state legislature might nullify the
power of municipalities to pass penal ordinances. Any enactment by
the legislature in the police power domain would virtually pre-empt
municipalities from legislating in that particular field. This is clearly
abortive to the concept of municipal home rule.
However, the compelling policy reason for the rule announced in
the Neil House case is the desirability of a uniform criminal law."8 But
whether uniformity is desired to the exclusion of local control in all in-
stances is a question considered throughout this study.
Express Conflict
Another alternative for allocating the power to pass penal ordinances
is to allow both the state and municipality to legislate concurrently. This
rule is analogous to the rule that the same act may be an offense against
the state and also an offense against the federal government, each offense
being punished without violation of the double jeopardy provisions of
15. 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944).
16. In Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 86, 167 N.E. 158, 160 (1929), the
court held that "when the law of the state provides that a rate of speed greater than a rate
therein specified shall be unlawful, it is equivalent to stating that driving at a less rate of
speed shall not be a violation of the law .. " This clearly is an application of the "implied
conflict" principle, although the court specifically stated that the test is the "express conflict"
rule announced in Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 265, 268, 140 N.E. 519, 521
(1923). The statute, however, was changed to read: "It shall be prima facie lawful for the
operator of a motor vehicle to drive the same at a speed not exceeding the following .... "
OHIO GEN. CODE § 12603 (Emphasis added). In Schwartz v. Badila, 133 Ohio St. 441, 14
N.E.2d 609 (1938), which had an almost identical factual situation, the proper decision was
reached.
17. Neil House Hotel Co. v. City of Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 253, 58 N.E.2d 665, 668
(1944) (dissenting opinion).
18. Noey v. City of Saginaw, 271 Mich. 595, 261 N.W. 88 (1935); Williams v. City of
Jackson, 164 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
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the United States Constitution.'9 The federal-state dichotomy is based
on double sovereignty or division of power.
But there is no analogous double sovereignty of, or division of power
between state and municipality. There is, nevertheless, a division of
power between state and municipality in the sense at least of a dele-
gation of part of the state power to a municipality relative to municipal
affairs.20
Another reason often given for this dual authority is that offenses
committed in municipalities may cause more serious consequences than
the same offenses committed outside the city boundaries. This is due to
additional injuries which could occur because of the greater number of
inhabitants in the cities.2 '
In Ohio, the earliest decision advocating this view was Greenburg v.
City of Cleveland." While interpreting the intent of the people in
adopting the Home Rule Amendment, the court held that both the state
and municipalities may exercise the same power so long as they do not
conflict with each other. The court noted that there was no express
statute covering the identical offense the ordinance defined. However,
by way of dictum, the court said that "even if the general assembly...
in express terms prohibited the municipality from legislating upon the
same subject-matter," the ordinance still would be valid.23
It also has been held that Ohio municipalities have concurrent power
with the state legislature to define the crime of assault and battery.24
Furthermore, where the state defined a crime involving lotteries, it did
not pre-empt the municipality from passing a similar ordinance.25
Of course, there is a limit to how far the municipality can go in
exercising its independent jurisdiction as a dual sovereign. Illustrative
of this limit is the court's decision in Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 6 which
validated a municipal ordinance that prohibited the manufacture and
sale of liquor. "No real conflict can exist unless the ordinance declares
something to be right which the state law declares to be wrong, or vice
versa."27 Unless one authority grants a license to do something expressly
prohibited by the other, there can be no "conflict."
This definition of "conflict" has been followed by the majority of
19. 6 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 23.10, at 402-04 (3d ed. 1949);
Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
20. 6 McQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 404.
21. Id. at 405.
22. 98 Ohio St. 282, 120 N.E. 829 (1918).
23. Id. at 286, 120 N.E. at 830.
24. City of Dayton v. Miller, 154 Ohio St. 500, 96 N.E.2d 780 (1951).
25. City of Cleveland v. Jones, 184 N.E.2d 494 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
26. 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
27. Id. at 268, 140 N.E. at 521.
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Ohio courts. For example, driving under certain enumerated speed
limits was prima facie lawful under the applicable state statute. A
municipal ordinance, however, stated that driving under these speed
limits may be prima facie recklessness due to adverse weather conditions.
The ordinance, therefore, was in "conflict" with the "general law" of the
state and invalid.28 But an ordinance relating to "beggars" within the
city limits is not in conflict with a state law applying only to male
"tramps" outside of their home community.!9  The court found no con-
flict, i.e., no "discord of action, feeling or effect; nor antagonism of in-
terests or principles ...
In conjunction with the problem of dual sovereignty is the problem
of double jeopardy. There is still some doubt in various jurisdictions as
to whether punishment under a statute can be imposed for an act con-
stituting violation of the statute and an ordinance concurrently.3' The
view in Ohio is that punishment for one offense is not a bar to punish-
ment for another offense growing out of the same act.32 Moreover,
whether it is unfair to subject one to double prosecution for one act is
not a judicial problem, but one in the realm of legislative determination."u
Having determined that the "implied right" theory announced in the
Neil House case advocates uniformity in the law, it is readily seen that
creating a type of dual sovereignty is an attempt to decentralize the power
of the state to define crimes and to give this power to the individual
municipality. Whether this is a valid consideration will be scrutinized
in a subsequent section.
"CONFLICT" IN PENALTIES
In the above discussion, "conflict" was determined by comparing the
substantive provisions of statutes and municipal ordinances. While this
determination is the first step in ascertaining whether an ordinance is in
conflict with a state statute, it is not the exclusive test. Not only must
the ordinance and statute be substantively non-conflicting, but the pun-
ishment prescribed in the ordinance must also be in harmony with the
punishment designated in the statute.3"
28. Schwartz v. Badila, 133 Ohio St. 441, 14 N.B.2d 609 (1938).
29. City of Cleveland v. Gogola, 113 N.E.2d 264, 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953).
30. Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 268, 140 NXE. 519, 521 (1923), citing
THE CENTURY DIcIONARY when defining "conflict" as used in article XVIII, section 3 of
the Ohio Constitution.
31. 6 McQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 19, § 23.12.
32. State v. Martin, 154 Ohio St. 539, 96 NXE.2d 776 (1951); Koch v. State, 53 Ohio St.
433, 41 NE. 689 (1895).
33. Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
34. City of Dayton v. Miller, 154 Ohio St. 500, N.E.2d 780 (1951). Village of Struthers v.
Sokol, sapra note 33.
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When an ordinance and statute define the same act as a crime, but
impose different penalties, the technical test of "conflict" enunciated in
the Struthers case does not apply. Therefore, even though some courts
hold that they are following the Struthers decision, they invariably apply
the test: is the municipality empowered to impose such a penalty under
the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution?3"
Both Misdemeanors
Ohio courts have been unanimous in their decisions when the pe-
nalties in the statute and ordinance are both misdemeanors. For example,
"Where the only distinction between a state statute and a municipal
ordinance ... is as to the penalty only but not to the degree (misde-
meanor or felony) of the offense, the ordinance is not in conflict with
the general law of the state."36  Thus, where state law prescribes a man-
datory three-day jail sentence for a conviction of drunken driving, a
municipal ordinance which does not require the mandatory sentence is
not in conflict with the general law. 7
Statute is a Felony; Ordinance a Misdemeanor
Another approach is taken by the courts, however, when the differ-
ence between the statute and the ordinance is that the statute makes the
violation of an act a felony, but violation of the same act under the ordi-
nance is a misdemeanor. Although the court recognized that
as a practical matter . . . [it] might be desirable to encourage the ap-
prehension and prosecution [of those who commit this crime by the mu-
nicipality itself] .... [It could not] ignore those provisions of organic
and statutory law which preclude such a result.38
Where the state statute on obscene literature differed from the Cin-
cinnati ordinance in respect to degree of punishment - the statute mak-
ing the offense a felony and the ordinance a misdemeanor - the ordi-
nance contravened the statute. The demurrer to the affidavit of the city,
therefore, was sustained on appeal."9
There are some Ohio courts, however, which follow a different line
of reasoning and achieve an opposite result. Notably, in Savage v.
Alvis,4 ° an Ohio appellate court found no justification for prohibiting a
municipality from punishing an offense as a misdemeanor, although the
35. In City of Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958), the court
determined that Struthers was not the "exclusive" test.
36. City of Toledo v. Best, 172 Ohio St. 371, 176 N.E.2d 520 (1961) (syllabus).
37. Id. at 375, 176 N.E.2d at 522.
38. City of Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St. 386, 390, 154 N.E.2d 917, 919 (1958).
39. City of Cincinati v. Coy, 115 Ohio App. 478, 182 N.E.2d 628 (1962).
40. 109 Ohio App. 523, 161 N.E.2d 633 (1959).
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penalty under the statute was a felony. The legislature can create several
crimes arising out of a single transaction. In addition, more than one
penal statute can be enacted covering the same offense, without prosecu-
tion for one crime being a bar to subsequent prosecution for the other.
Therefore, the municipality should be allowed to punish crimes as mis-
demeanors whether the legislature has designated the punishment for
the same crime a felony or misdemeanor.41 The court in the Savage case,
however, is in the minority in Ohio. The dissenting opinion expressed
the popular Ohio view:
We do not believe that an offense can be both a felony and a mis-
demeanor .... [Since both] statutes are repugnant as to the punishment,
they should not be permitted to stand.42
Penalty in Ordinance is Much Greater Than Statute,
But Not a Felony
Thus far it has been observed that where the statute prescribes a
penalty that is only slightly greater than the comparable municipal ordi-
nance, the courts of Ohio have refused to strike down the ordinance.
There is no conflict with the general laws of the state under article
XVIH, section 3 of the Ohio Constitution. It has also been noted that
where the penalty is so different that the statute imposes a felony and
the ordinance a misdemeanor, the ordinance has been held invalid as
conflicting with the general laws of the state. The remaining situation,
therefore, is where the penalty in the ordinance is much greater than in
the statute, but is not as great as the punishment for a felony. Such a
situation was present in Matthews v. Russell.43 The City of Dayton had
a municipal ordinance which punished the crime of assault and battery
with a maximum of a one thousand dollar fine and one year in the work-
house. The state statute designated a fine of not more than two hundred
dollars, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. Clearly,
the penalty was much greater in the ordinance, but the court refused to
strike it down on the theory that the penalty in an ordinance is not con-
fined or limited to the penalty in the state statute.44
DETERMINATION BY SUBJECT MATTER
Limiting the discussion thus far to the technical meaning of "conflict
with general laws" has resulted in a neglect of policy considerations.
41. Id. at 527, 161 N.B.2d at 636.
42. Savage v. Alvis, 109 Ohio App. 523, 529-30, 161 N.E.2d 633, 637 (1959) (dissenting
opinion).
43. 87 Ohio App. 443, 95 N.E.2d 696 (1949).
44. Id. at 445, 95 N.E.2d at 697. At the time of City of Dayton v. Miller, 154 Ohio St. 500,
96 NB.2d 780 (1951), there was a question of whether this doctrine would be extended to
include felonies. See generally 13 Omo ST. Lj. 111 (1952).
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Courts, however, are conscious of the possible effects of their decisions
upon society, even though they may not mention this in their opinion.
Therefore, policy arguments have great influence upon courts in weigh-
ing first, what substantive powers were intended to be conferred exclu-
sively to the municipalities, and second, which powers were intended to
come under police powers. Moreover, once an ordinance is classified
under the police power, policy arguments must be considered in deter-
mining "conflict" with similar state laws.
Streets and Traffic
The problem of controlling streets and traffic is best illustrated by
the case of Schneiderman v. Sesanstein.45  This case involved section
12603 of the Ohio General Code, which made a rate of speed greater
than twenty-five miles per hour prima facie evidence of unreasonable
and improper driving outside the business district of a municipal corpora-
tion. Section 12608 of the General Code stated that the above provi-
sions "shall not be diminished, restricted or prohibited by an ordinance
... of a municipality.... " A comparable ordinance in the city of Akron
established a speed limit of fifteen miles per hour in a school zone. The
alleged injury in this civil action occurred outside the Akron business
district, but in a school zone, bringing into play the statutes and the
ordinance.
The dissenting opinion" took the view that the right to regulate traf-
fic on city streets is a power peculiar to the municipality. After all, the
argument continued, traffic problems are different in every community.
Therefore, traffic regulation should be handled by each municipality
rather than by the state. In recognition of this fact, the dissent con-
cluded that the power to regulate traffic on the streets of the city should
be a power of local self-government. The majority, however, categor-
ized the regulation of traffic as part of the police power of the state.
Therefore, municipal traffic ordinances must not be in conflict with com-
parable state statutes. Thus, using the "implied right" theory for de-
termining substantive conflict,4" especially when coupled with General
Code section 12687,48 the ordinance was declared to be invalid.
45. 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929).
46. Id. at 92, 167 N.E. at 162 (dissenting opinion).
47. See note 15 supra.
48. The court overlooked the argument that section 12603 of the General Code is not a
"general law" as contemplated by article XVIII, section 3 of the Ohio Constitution and,
therefore, is not a limitation on the municipalities' power to regulate traffic. Supporting this
argument is City of Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N.E. 114 (1917), which held
that a statute, which provided that local authorities shall not regulate the speed of motor
vehicles by ordinance, was not a general law. Moreover, in City of Youngstown v. Evans,
121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929), where the statute in question limited the term of
imprisonment a municipal ordinance could impose to six months, the court found this to be
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Similar situations recently have evolved around section 4511.19 of
the Revised Code, prohibiting driving while intoxicated; section 4511.99
(B), requiring a mandatory three-day jail sentence for driving while in-
toxicated; section 4511.06, prescribing uniform application of Chapter
4511 in all political subdivisions of the state;49 section 2947.13, permit-
ting suspension of a sentence in misdemeanors; and the Toledo driving-
while-intoxicated ordinance, which has no mandatory three-day jail sen-
tence. The only case to reach the Ohio Supreme Court resolving these
laws was City of Toledo v. Best.5" Using questionable statutory construc-
tion,"' the court refused to apply section 4511.99(B) on the grounds
that the proper applicable statute was section 2947.13. Therefore, the
Toledo ordinance was valid, and the mandatory three-day jail sentence
was not observed.
Although there is no question that the Best decision represents the
highest authority construing these statutes, Ohio's lower courts prior to
the Best case were reluctant to follow this same line of reasoning. The
first case in point was City of Toledo v. Ransom." In this case the court
held section 4511.99 (B) of the Revised Code valid and applicable."
an abuse of legislative discretion repugnant to the Ohio Constitution. On the basis of these
decisions, it is difficult to justify a provision in a statute which attempts to control the police
power of the municipal corporation by an express stipulation limiting that power. This is so
especially in the light of modern constitutional interpretation which acknowledges that the
grant of police power comes from the grant of "all powers of home rule." The limitation in
the second half of article XVIII section 3 is there to insure uniformity of law where the
state wishes to promulgate a specific regulation of police power. But clearly, where the state
has not adopted such a police regulation, the legislature is not justified in limiting the power
of the municipality as conferred by the constitution. 3 FARRELL-ELLIS, op. cit. supra note 7,
§ 1.30(a).
49. Section 4511.06 of the Ohio Revised Code states: "Sections 4511.01 to 4511.78, inclusive
[and) 4511.99. .. of the Revised Code shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state
and in all political subdivisions and municipal corporations therein, and no local authority shall
enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with such sections." (Emphasis added). Is
this statute a "general law" as contemplated by article XVIII, section 3 of the Ohio Constitu-
tion? See note 46 supra.
50. 172 Ohio St. 371, 176 N.E.2d 520 (1961).
51. Although the court "adopts" the court of appeals' decision, it makes the additional ob-
servation that section 2947.10 of the Ohio Revised Code, which is the authority for courts
to impose a fine, imprisonment, or both, if the misdemeanor calls for punishment of a fine
and imprisonment, and section 2947.13, which allows the courts to suspend such a sentence,
must be read in pari materia with all other criminal statutes, specifically section 4511.99(B).
Therefore, the three-day mandatory jail sentence did not apply. This author feels that the
court failed to apply the apparent legislative intent expressed in a latter, specific statute, which
accentuated a strong public policy to bolster the laws in regard to drunken driving. "A statute
is not in pari nateria if its scope and aim are distinct or where a legislative design to depart
from the general purpose or policy of previous enactments may be apparent." LLEWBLLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADTON - DEcIDING APPEALS app. C., at 523 (1960).
52. 169 N.B.2d 657 (Toledo, Ohio Munic. Ct. 1960).
53. This case acknowledges one of the most important reasons for allowing municipal or-
dinances to exist where there is also a state statute. That is, "it is obvious that the ordinance
is more beneficial to the municipality, at least for the purpose of raising funds rather than
incurring expenses for imprisonments." Id. at 660 (dictum).
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Moreover, in Village of Hiram v. Conner,54 the court persuasively
argued that it was the express intent of the legislature in section 4511.06
of the Revised Code to make the problem of traffic operating offenses
and penalties uniform throughout the state.55 Thus, the court invalidated
an ordinance identical to Toledo's drunken driving ordinance.
In the Best case, the Ohio Supreme Court advocated the policy of
local control of traffic regulation. Although this author believes in as
much local control as is feasible, uniformity of motor vehicle laws is an
end that will:
1) Enable motorists and pedestrians to know and obey the rules
wherever they go, because the rules would be the same every-
where;
2) Make a more orderly and efficient flow of traffic;
3) Reduce the danger of accidents - with their toll of death and injury;
4) Improve the standards for driver licensing, lead to better enforce-
ment, and yield extensive economic benefits.56
These goals are noteworthy and should be considered by the supreme
court when they next have the opportunity to choose between uniformity
and local autonomy in moving traffic regulations.
Felonies
"In many jurisdictions the rule is that felonies .. .cannot be dealt
with by ordinance under general power, since they are regarded as of
state-wide and not local concern."" The power to define and punish
serious crimes, such as arson and murder, is, likewise, not a power of
home rule in Ohio.5" Because, historically, a felony conviction carried
with it penalties of a severe and lasting character, and because these
"serious" crimes were considered crimes against the sovereign and not
against the municipality, it was unheard of for a municipality to legislate
in the field of serious, felonious crimes.
But the distinction that courts make in prohibiting such action is, to
say the least, puzzling. In City of Dayton v. Miller,"9 the court held that
municipal corporations have the authority to define the offense of assault
and battery, the ordinance in point having a possible one-year jail sen-
tence as a punishment. If the possible penalty would have been impri-
54. 173 N.E.2d 408 (Ravenna, Ohio Munic. Ct. 1960).
55. "This consuming desire for uniformity of treatment of traffic offenders is in line with
modern development and it is noteworthy that the cry of traffic safety authorities ... is directed
toward uniformity of punishment." Id. at 411.
56. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE FOR TRAFFIc SAFETY, LAWS AND Om iNANcEs 5 (1961).
57. 6 McQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 19, § 23.06, at 391.
58. Fordham & Asher, Home Rule in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 18, 68 (1948).
59. 154 Ohio St. 500, 96 N.E.2d 780 (1951).
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sonment for one year and a day,"0 there is no question that the ordinance
would have been in conflict with the general laws of the state and, there-
fore, invalid.6 But, since it is for one day less, it is enforceable. 2 Such
a line of demarcation is both arbitrary and unjustifiable. This author
suggests that there are crimes, peculiarly within the scope of home rule
powers, which municipalities should be allowed to define and punish
whether they are technically felonies or misdemeanors. The state legis-
lature is not as sensitive to the needs and wants of the individual com-
munities as are city councils.6" It is hoped, therefore, that Ohio munici-
palities will be allowed to follow the trend of municipal corporations in
other jurisdictions
in predicating municipal power to create and punish for offenses upon
general municipal police power regardless of whether the offense is
theoretically conceived as one against the state or one against the munici-
pality."
It is true that there must be a line drawn in defining crimes due to
the need for uniformity in the law. The location of this line should not
be determined by how great the penalty is, but should be based on con-
scientious weighing of the equities of local control versus uniformity of
state action. The fear of unruly and precarious abuses of discretion by
the municipalities in the light of increased power, however, is eliminated
when it is remembered that all legislation, whether by municipalities or
state legislatures, is still subject to the safeguards provided by the con-
stitutional prohibitions against unreasonableness and arbitrariness.65
"Laws or ordinances passed by virtue of police power which limit or
abrogate constitutionally guaranteed rights must not be arbitrary, dis-
60. Section 1.06 of the Ohio Revised Code defines, in part, a felony as an offense which may
be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary. Section 1.05 states that imprisonment in
the penitentiary is for offenses with a maximum term of longer than one year.
61. In City of Cleveland v. Jones, 184 NXE.2d 494 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962), the court held an
ordinance which made the possession of policy slips a misdemeanor valid, as the comparable
state statute also made the possession of policy slips a misdemeanor. However, by way of
dictum, the court clearly asserts that if this defendant were ever found guilty of the same
crime in the future, the municipal ordinance then would be void since the state statute makes
subsequent convictions a felony. The court, therefore, determines the validity of the municipal
ordinance on the basis of whether this was a first or second offense. The court's "logic" dearly
indicates the need for a new standard.
62. One argument presented for the position that municipalities should not be allowed to
define crimes which are felonies is that "a strong historical argument can be made ... [T]his
power has never been delegated to cities anywhere else in the United States" so it probably
was not intended to be delegated in Ohio. 13 OHio ST. .J. 111, 113 (1952).
63. Except in very serious offenses such as murder, rape, etc. many authors take the position
that the state and city should have concurrent power "in some situations" to punish the same
crime, although they should not be able to punish them separately. This is especially true
when paradoxical situations exist, as in Ohio, where manpower of municipal police forces
is so much greater than state highway patrolmen and sheriffs. Scott, Municipal Penal Or-
dinances it Colorado, 30 ROcKY MT. I. Rmv. 267, 283 (1958).
64. 6 McQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 19, § 23.02, 381-83.
65. City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 49 N.E.2d 412 (1943).
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criminatory, capricious, or unreasonable and must bear a real and sub-
stantial relation to the subject to be obtained, namely the health, safety,
morals, or general welfare of the public."
66
CONCLUSION
There are many areas within the scope of the police power of Ohio
municipalities neglected in this discussion. An attempt has been made,
however, to inform the reader of the processes taken by the courts in
determining the validity of municipal ordinances under the Home Rule
Amendment.
The first criterion for ratification of municipal ordinances by the
courts is that the ordinance must not conflict with "general laws" of the
state. "General laws" are statutes which expressly define conduct to be
followed throughout the state. Statutes which attempt to limit the
power of the municipality to impose penal sanctions other than those im-
posed by the state are not "general laws."
A municipal ordinance is in "conflict" with a state statute when the
ordinance creates a right prohibited by the statute, or vice versa. A
minority of Ohio courts, however, hold that conduct not expressly pro-
hibited by a statute impliedly creates a legal right which cannot be abro-
gated by a municipal ordinance.
The second criterion for ratification is that the penalty in the ordi-
nance must be in harmony with the penalty in the statute. Penalties un-
der municipal ordinances may be greater or lesser than those prescribed
by statute so long as both penalties are misdemeanors. If punishment
under a statute is a felony, however, the municipality cannot punish the
same act as a misdemeanor. Moreover, Ohio municipalities have no
power to enact a punishment for a felony.
Finally, and most important, the conduct of the municipality must
be within the range of activity that the municipality, rather than the
state, is best able to regulate. In determining this, courts must look to
the equities embodied in uniformity of the law in comparison with the
attributes of local home rule.
The trend seems to lead to an increasing amount of power in the
municipal corporation. How far, and into what fields it will eventually
go is beyond the imagination of this author. It is hoped, moreover, that
the courts will take heed to the organic needs of municipalities as they
undergo their inevitable change in today's urban age.
Because the police power is based on public necessity it is impossible
to state in advance of knowing the particular circumstances relied on as
the basis for the exercise of the police power whether the subject of a
particular police regulation is a proper one. Precedents are not con-
trolling because changes in social and economic need brought about
66. 3 FARRELL-ELLIS, OHIO MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.5, at 279-80.
[Vol. 14:786
